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The uneven spatial distribution of start-ups and their respective survival may reflect 
comparative advantages resulting from the local institutional background. For the first 
time, we explore this idea using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to assess the 
relative efficiency of Portuguese municipalities in this specific context. We depart from 
the related literature where expenditure is perceived as a desirable input by choosing a 
measure of fiscal responsibility and infrastructural variables in the first stage. 
Comparing results for 2006 and 2010, we find that mean performance decreased 
substantially 1) with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, 2) as municipal 
population increases and 3) as financial independence decreases.  
A second stage is then performed employing a double-bootstrap procedure to evaluate 
how the regional context outside the control of local authorities (e.g. demographic 
characteristics and political preferences) impacts on efficiency.  
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The Global Financial Crisis deteriorated citizen’s confidence in policymakers and 
weakened individual future prospects. On the one hand, reforms intended at enhancing 
the efficiency of all levels of government have been increasingly gaining importance. In 
this context, local public services are especially under scrutiny as more decentralized 
policies are being designed and monitoring costs for voters are lower (Devas and Delay, 
2006). On the other, high unemployment rates have called for the resurgence of 
entrepreneurship as a viable career option. The continual process of creation and 
destruction (Shiva’s Dance in the Hindu culture) is, once again, perceived as vital to 
society’s dynamics. This paradigm shift, however, is not blind to recognize that benefits 
of newcomers come at a cost of some incumbents.  
This paper attempts to provide a systematic investigation on the role of municipalities in 
creating the conditions to encourage private firm establishment and development. We 
use a linear frontier technique – Data Envelopment Analysis (henceforth, DEA) – to 
assess, in the first stage, relative performance in this context. 
Providing incentives for greater transparency and enhanced competition among 
municipalities is especially important as this exercise can be subject to some misgivings 
and misinterpretations. Indeed, oftentimes, not all the appropriate variables are taken 
into consideration, which might end in biased results. The current report addresses these 
concerns by computing preliminary regression-based results, and in the second stage, 
the double-bootstrap proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) to evaluate the determinants 
of relative performance. All in all, we explore a comprehensive set of variables based on 
– but not uncritically accepting – the related literature, as well as on the specific features 
of Portuguese municipalities. As we want to unveil how the regional context changed 
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with the crisis, we selected data from two post local (and national) election years (2006 
and 2010) to comment on the evolution before and during the turmoil. This option is 
encouraged by evidence gathered by Veiga and Veiga (2006) and Aidt et al. (2011) on 
the presence of rational political business cycles (PBC) at the municipal level. In line 
with the Rogoff (1990) model, bureaucrats ended up distorting expenditures and taxes 
to signal greater competency in the two years before elections.
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Portugal is a particularly interesting case study for this purpose. Firstly, the titanic 
effects of the economic crisis provide a good testing ground for possible changes in 
relevance between factors. Secondly, our dataset is based on a single country rather than 
a combination of several states with diverse policy instruments. Thirdly, representatives 
are chosen in highly partisan elections. Lastly, mainland municipalities are all subject to 
the same rules (including coincident election dates).  
One should note that this investigation does not focus on capturing factors which may 
impact on birth and death rates on a national level but are unlikely to diverge across 
municipalities such as the minimum efficient scale in different sectors or 
macroeconomic fluctuations. We are primarily concerned with what may govern 
regional dissimilarities, comparing their evolution before and during the financial crisis.  
This study is organized as follows: in section II, a short tour on the related literature is 
provided while, in III, some stylized facts about Portuguese local governments are 
presented. In section IV, the empirical strategy is addressed. Regarding the first stage, V 
clarifies which inputs and outputs are selected, and section VI discusses the results. For 
the second stage, VII reports the non-discretionary factors considered, whereas VIII 
explains the results. Finally, section IX concludes. 
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 The theory of PBC was popularized by Nordhaus (1975). Empirical investigations of rational PBC 
include Alesina and Roubini (1992), Alesina et al. (1993) and, for Portugal, Baleiras and Costa (2004). 
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II. Literature Review 
Our intent in this section is twofold as we will survey both the literature on the regional 
determinants of firm creation and destruction, and the methodological advances in 
assessing municipal efficiency. 
Entrepreneurship, to begin with, is a topic of growing interest for academics and 
policymakers. Even if one does not believe either in a Marxian contradiction 
(“capitalism cannot survive because of economic failure”) or in a Schumpeterian 
paradox (“capitalism is being destroyed because of its very creative success”), the role 
of creative destruction is key (Elliott, 1980). The idea itself is a very old one. But it was 
only since Schumpeter (1934) that researchers have been pointing out a whole array of 
benefits produced by entrepreneurs ranging from employment (Blanchflower, 2000 and, 
for Portugal, Baptista et al., 2014) to production (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996) and 
innovation (Acs and Audretsch, 1988).
3
 
Concentration is not a new concept for economists since Marshall (1920) concluded that 
external economies of scale arise on a regional level. In recent times, more attention has 
been devoted to inspect the relevance of entrepreneurship for local growth and the 
causes of its regional variation.
4
 In this regard, Armington and Acs (2002) describe 
regional externalities (or agglomeration effects), unemployment, entrepreneurial culture 
and industrial restructuring as the main topics to be considered. All of them are reflected 
throughout the remainder of this paper.  
In Portugal, Figueiredo et al. (2002) concluded that investors tend to locate in close 
proximity of their residence area. Nevertheless, firm births seem erratically distributed 
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 These contributions (together with a long tradition of several papers) confirm predictions stated by the 
endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1990) and new economic geography (Krugman, 1991). 
4
 For good references on the importance of defining the concept of “regional competitiveness” as well as 
the theoretical, empirical and policy debate involved see Porter (2003) and Kitson et al. (2004). For a 
good recent survey see Fritsch (2008). 
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through the territory when controlling exclusively for population. This suggests that 
other dynamics associated to the local environment constrain entrepreneurial intensity.
5
  
The literature on municipal efficiency can be divided into individual or global public 
services. While the former focuses on specific public goods that are provided by each 
municipality, the latter consists in a performance assessment of local authorities as a 
whole. For the second case, noteworthy contributions by Afonso and Fernandes (2008) 
and Cruz and Marques (2014) on Portuguese municipalities for the years of 2003 and 
2009, respectively, should be highlighted. Both concluded that the large majority of 
municipalities could improve overall performance without necessarily increasing their 




III. Portuguese Institutional Framework: Local Government Sector 
Sub-national governments in Portugal assume only two levels: the autonomous regions 
of Madeira and Azores, and administrative municipalities. The first municipal elections 
under democratic rule took place in 1976 and, since then, there has been an important 
widespread of local governments’ competencies. For instance, they are responsible for 
the promotion of education, health, transport, communication, culture and leisure. After 
joining the European Economic Community in 1986, municipalities’ funds increased 
considerably and, in 1999, there were new extensions of their activities to enhance, 
among other responsibilities, the attraction of private investment (Law 159/99).  
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 For more details on Portuguese firms see Mata et al. (1995) and Cabral and Mata (2003). 
6
 A special focus is devoted to a plethora of papers exploring non-parametric techniques. Examples of 
studies covering individual public services include energy and water provision (von Hirschhausen et al., 
2006 and Byrnes et al., 2010, respectively), public transportation (Walter and Cullmann, 2008), road 
maintenance (Kalb, 2009), public libraries (Witte and Geys, 2009), fire protection (Lan et al., 2009), local 
police forces (García-Sánchez, 2009), child-care provision (Montén and Thater, 2011) and recycling 
systems (Marques et al., 2012). For global public services, relevant empirical work was made for Belgium 
(De Borger et al., 1994 and De Borger and Kerstens, 1996), Spain (Prieto and Zofio, 2001 and Balaguer-
Coll et al., 2007), Finland (Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2005), Brazil (Sousa and Stósic, 2005) and 
Germany (Bönisch et al., 2011).  
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Portuguese municipalities are governed by the Municipal Assembly and the Town 
Council. The top candidate from the most voted list becomes the president of the Town 
Council (mayor) and, at the end of each year, this executive body designs the local 
budget and the plan of activities for the next period. The process of implementing local 
policies requires the approval of the legislative body (Municipal Assembly) and is 
subject to both internal and external control mechanisms from central government 
agencies and the Court of Accounts. 
In this context, municipalities are responsible for the bulk of consolidated expenditures 
of the local tier of government and such item is divided into current and capital 
expenditures. The subcomponents of the first part include expenditures on goods and 
services, and compensation of employees while those associated to the second share 
comprise investment, financial assets and liabilities, and capital transfers to parishes.  
As for revenues, despite the fact that local authorities are financially independent, their 
main sources of income still rely on transfers from national and European funds. 
Moreover, this redistributive nature is especially imperative for poor municipalities. On 
the other hand, the relative importance of real estate as a fiscal basis for local taxes has 
significantly increased in the past few years since municipalities have, within certain 
limits, the autonomy to set property tax rates (IMI). Remaining resources come from 




IV. Empirical Strategy 
DEA is a non-parametric methodology (i.e., a maximum likelihood estimate of an 
unobserved true frontier, conditional on data which is not required to fit a normal 
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 For a rigorous exploration on the country background see Tavares (2004) and Blanchard (2006). For 
further details on Portuguese municipalities see Silva (2008), Costa et al. (2013) and Martins and Veiga 
(2013). Table A.1. provides a comparison among local governments in Europe. 
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distribution) that does not try to answer how a certain quantity of output resulted from 
the political process. Nor does it represent welfare equilibrium from a benevolent social 
planner perspective. Instead, as an output-oriented strategy is followed, it just analyzes 
whether the maximum output is attained vis-a-vis the given quantity of inputs provided 
in the municipality.
8
  The reason behind this choice is motivated by the fact that 
political agents may have an incentive not to use inputs optimally (Niskanen, 1975 and 
Hayes et al., 1998). Furthermore, as previously stated, Portuguese local government’s 
areas of intervention are very broad, and their tasks are not restricted towards creating 
an appropriate environment for business formation.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that DEA is used to study this 
phenomenon. We believe this is a suitable approach for several reasons. According to 
De Borger and Kerstens (1996, p. 167), “to the extent that there are no a priori reasons 
to prefer one methodology over the others and as long as there is no solution to the 
problem of choosing the “best” reference technology (…), it seems to be preferable to 
analyze public sector efficiency questions using a broad spectrum of different methods 
and to find out just how robust the results are”. If we pursued, for example, an 
econometric cost or expenditure function approach, we would be assuming that the 
underlying production function was efficient. In this setting, the error term would 
therefore contain inseparable inefficiency and statistic misspecification components 
(Bönisch et al., 2011). Moreover, although parametric approaches such as the stochastic 
frontier analysis present the advantage of allowing deviations from the efficient frontier 
due to stochastic influences or measurement errors, they are usually not realistic when 
price data is not available. In fact, although the notion that the cost-inefficiency and 
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 An input-oriented strategy evaluates how much input quantities can be proportionally reduced while 
keeping constant the quantity of outputs.  
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statistical noise are uncorrelated may be reasonable with cost equation variables for 
competitive markets, it may be less convincing if there are producer-specific differences 
in the quality of the output created (Greene et al., 2013).
9
 Prices in DEA are unknown 
but, given that all municipalities in Portugal have access to the same capital market and 
are constrained by the same collective wage agreement, they are assumed to be 
identical. In addition, DEA does not require an a priori assumption of a particular 
functional form for public decision making units (henceforth, DMU). Finally, another 
important characteristic of DEA, in sharp contrast to other parametric methods that 
determine an idealized standard of performance, is that this technique seeks to examine 
the efficiency of a DMU (e.g., municipality) relative to its peers.  
DEA was introduced in the economic literature by Charnes et al. (1978) based on the 
seminal contribution by Farrell (1957). One should note that efficiency is understood in 
this scheme as the ratio between a weighted sum of outputs and a weighted sum of 
inputs.
10
 A convex hull is thus computed from data on a multiplicity of inputs and 
outputs by applying linear programming techniques not subject to statistical problems 
such as simultaneous equation bias (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008). To form a 
piecewise production possibilities frontier, the number of inputs and outputs should be 
low as they would otherwise be compared along more dimensions and, subsequently, 
the number of efficient DMUs would be larger. Scores are derived on the basis of 
relative distances of inefficient observations from the frontier. To do so, we solve the 
following problem for municipality j, having each one the outputs yo and the inputs xo: 
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 For a good survey on the comparison between the different parametric and non-parametric methods see 
De Borgen and Kerstens (1996), Worthington and Dollery (2000) and Coelli et al. (2005). 
10
 More information on DEA can be found in Cooper (2000) and Thanassoulis et al. (2008). In the 
economic literature, three main measures of efficiency are mentioned: technical, allocative and dynamic 
efficiency. Since we refer to the use of inputs in the most technologically efficient manner, technical 
efficiency considerations are therefore developed in this paper. 
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 Max θ0  
Subject to ∑ 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗  ≤  𝑥0
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                      (1)   
∑ 𝜆𝑗 𝑦𝑗  ≥  𝜃0 𝑦0
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                   (2) 
∑ 𝜆𝑗   =  1
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                           (3) 
𝜆𝑗 ≥  0                                                              (4) 
Where θ0 is a scalar showing by how much the production of each DMU could increase 
and λ0 are weighting factors defined optimally in the model for each municipality. 
Therefore, DEA gives the ''benefit of the doubt" to each unit being evaluated by trying 
to make it look as efficient as possible in comparison with the others. 
At this stage, two important remarks must be added. First, an efficient DMU (θ0 =1) 
implies relative (not strictly or Pareto) efficiency. This means that these units represent 
the best existing – but not necessarily the best possible – operating units. Second, by 
adding the constraint (3) to the previous problem, we take into account the possibility 
that some DMUs might not be operating at the optimal scale. Hence, we are assuming 
variable returns to scale (VRS) outlined by Banker et al. (1984) rather than constant 
returns to scale (CRS).
11
 A comparison between the two can be found in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. CRS vs. VRS specification (Source: Thanassoulis et al., 2007) 
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 Additionally, Hollingsworth and Smith (2003) defended that VRS are the correct design when one uses 
ratios instead of absolute numbers as inputs and outputs. 
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The criterion adopted to assess efficiency is straightforward. In the first stage, we 
decided to use inputs that are, at least to a certain degree, manageable by the 
municipality and the exogenous outputs of interest to our research question. A second 
stage is then required in order to explain how environmental factors that are not part of 
the production process (e.g. political preferences) constrain the choices of both inputs 
and outputs, and thus, impact on performance. In this part, several papers calculated a 
censored (tobit) regression given that the dependent variable – the efficiency scores 
calculated in the first stage – cannot take values lower than one. However, this raises a 
problem of paramount importance as the process that regulates the probability of 
censuring is the same process defining how the uncensored observations are restricted 
(Ruggiero, 2004). Another concern is advanced by Simar and Wilson (2007). As inputs 
and outputs are correlated with the non-discretionary factors (otherwise it would not 
make sense to use them), the error term of the second stage is serially correlated with 
the efficiency scores. These scholars, using Monte Carlo experiments, developed a 
solution that will be implemented in section VIII of this paper: first, by employing a 
truncated regression and, afterwards, by establishing inference on a bootstrap procedure 




V. First Stage: Dataset, Inputs and Outputs  
In order to elect the most appropriate inputs, several preliminary regression-based 
robustness checks were conducted.
 
The purpose is to empirically investigate the 
reliability of our options and diminish the level of ad-hoc choice of inputs to be 
comprised in the frontier estimation.
13
  Even taking this strategy into consideration, our 
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 An important alternative is to perform the second stage via non-parametric smoothing techniques as 
proposed by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007).  
13
 A detailed explanation of the inputs and output variables and data sources is offered in Table A.2. 
Results of these previous robustness checks are shown in Table A.3. Additionally, Arouca (2013, p. 2) put 
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choices are not free from criticisms. Hence, we should hereafter explain each of the four 
institutional inputs under three different crucial vectors
14
:  
– Infrastructural geographic planning. Through the synergies of exploring an 
integrated location with informational spillovers, we expect that Industrial areas 
increase the likelihood of firm formation. Audretsch et al. (2004) illustrate the 
expansion of industrial parks, science and technology incubators as the most effective 
start-up oriented policy. Furthermore, tourism is a strategic segment for the Portuguese 
economy and, for this reason, Tourism areas are also considered; 
– Governance responsibility. Variables related to spending (e.g., total or capital 
expenditures) are widely used in the literature (see Table 1). Nonetheless, we fail to find 
empirical support for this option as more inputs (namely, financial resources) are not 
necessarily translated into more outputs in the presence of unbalanced budgets.
15
 We 
compute instead a measure of fiscal responsibility to ascertain the extent of interest 
payments in each municipality – Primary expenditures/Total expenditures. This 
constitutes a proxy for quality of spending rather than for quantity in the sense that 
money used to pay interests is not directed to improve local governments’ 
competencies. Moreover, a rational forward-looking entrepreneur will not take into 
account only the tax rates prevailing in a given year since she or he knows that more 
debt in the present will be reflected in a higher tax burden in the future; 
– Licensing outline. Public administration construction items are typically highly 
visible and help form expectations at the level of prevailing bureaucracy in the 
municipality. Wagner and Sternberg (2004) stressed that the extensiveness of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
emphasis on the importance of “both the development of business-related infrastructures and the signals 
stemming from sound financial management”. 
14
 For comparability reasons, we confine our attention on the 278 mainland municipalities because those 
overseas are subject to vertical externalities from an extra layer of power and specific fiscal benefits. 
15
 For example, raw results of a quadratic fitting between Entry_inc and the most referred expenditure 
variables (see Figure A.2) re-confirm the appropriateness of our choices. This idea is in accordance with 
evidence collected by Borge et al. (2008) and Arouca (2013)  
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cumbersome regulatory requirements can discourage the creation of new ventures. We 
proxy these effects using a construction ratio, measured as the ratio between the 
predicted duration of construction works and their effective duration. 
At the same time, we adopt two outputs with data drawn from Quadros de Pessoal, a 
yearly mandatory questionnaire on all companies with paid labor, to understand local 
entrepreneurial culture in Portugal:
16
 
– Start-up attraction. We decided to use the number of new business units divided by 
the incumbent firms (in this case, Entry_inc) to properly reveal the effects of regional 
clusters and measure the entry of new capabilities, an essential element of the market 
process.
17
 This approach relies on the idea that “for a meaningful comparison of regions 
or industries of different size or different economic potential, the number of start-ups 
has to be related to a measure of this economic potential” (Fritsch, 2008 p.5); 
– Firm survival. A similar strategy is followed as far as exits are concerned, but we 
transform this bad into a desirable output by taking its inverse (Exit_inc_inv) as 
recommended by Thanassoulis et al. (2007).  
Descriptive statistics of all inputs and outputs used to compute the efficiency of 
Portuguese mainland municipalities are presented in Table 2 for 2006 and 2010.
18
 To 
properly reflect the effects of the crisis, two further analyses are added: whereas Figure 
2 highlights the uneven geographical pattern of private firms’ net entry (Entry_inc – 
Exit_inc), Figure 3 displays the sharp differences between Entry_inc (higher in 2006) 
and Exit_inc (lower in 2006) distributions for both periods.  
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 Accordingly, cases of self-employment or family workers are not contemplated in Quadros de Pessoal. 
At the same time, other organizations such as public entities, foundations, associations or cooperatives are 
exempted from our analysis due to their non-profit nature. Furthermore, given its longitudinal matched 
employer-employee character, this source connects workers to their corresponding establishments and 
companies/ headquarters, with only the latter being considered in our analysis. 
17
 In a given year, a plant is identified as Entry (Exit) if it was absent in the files for the two preceding 
(following) years (Mata and Portugal, 1994). For other examples of past usage see Mata et al. (1995), 
Cabral and Mata (2003), Holl (2004), Baptista and Mendonça (2010) and Mata and Freitas (2012). 
18
 We cope with zeros in data by replacing them by 0.0001 as suggested by Bessent and Bessent (1979). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for Inputs (I) and Outputs (O) in 2006, 2010 (Source: own construction) 
 
 



















VI. Assessing efficiency results and brief discussion  
The results of the VRS output-oriented DEA calculations for mainland local authorities, 
along with average results per NUTS 2 regions, can be found in Figure 4. To properly 
interpret them, one should recall that the higher the value of θj, the less efficient is the 
DMU given the referred inputs and outputs. 
Variables  Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs 
(I) Industrial area  
          2006 
          2010 
(I) Tourism area  
          2006 
          2010 
(I) Primary expenditures/ Total Expenditures 
          2006 
          2010 
(I) Construction ratio 
          2006 
          2010 
(O) Entry_inc 
          2006 
          2010 
(O) Exit_inc_inv 
          2006 



























































































Figure 2. Municipal Net Entry_inc in 2006 and 2010, 
respectively.  
Figure 3. Entry_inc and Exit_inc  








Notes: Number of efficient units in 2006 (14/278: Ovar, Barrancos, Alfândega da Fé, Vinhais, Oleiros, Proença-a-
Nova, Sertã, Nelas, Redondo, Reguengos de Monsaraz, Almeida, Monforte, Chamusca and Ribeira de Pena) and in 
2010 (10/278: Barrancos, Castro Verde, Vinhais, Idanha-a-Nova, Oleiros, Vila Velha de Rodão, Reguengos de 
Monsaraz, Monforte, Vila Nova da Barquinha and Ribeira de Pena). 
 
In this framework, one can clearly observe the rampant effects coincident with the 
eruption of the Global Financial Crisis on municipal performance in Portugal.  From 
one period to the other, scores deteriorated sharply as the mean relative inefficiency 
increased from 1,4715 in 2006 to 1,7158 in 2010. These results can be read in the 
following way: net private firm entry divided by incumbents could be, on average and 
given the local inputs, more than 47% higher in 2006 and almost 72% higher four years 
later.  Moreover, these results are persistent if we cluster for all NUTS 2 regions. 
We also portray yearly efficiency scores (in blue) by means of Tukey’s boxplots in 
Figures 5 and 6.
19
 In addition, we separate, for both years, results below (in red) and 
above (in green) the median.  
First of all, we exhibit performance scores for small and large municipalities (in terms 
of population) in Figure 5.  
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 Boxplots are particularly instructive as DEA is bounded by one, and a mass of DMUs reaches this 
lower bound leading to skewed distributions. They offer a simple and scrupulous image which encodes 
information on the existence of outliers. For each class, the box defines the 50% mid-range values of the 
efficiency scores, while the breakdown line and the length within each box respectively represent the 
median and the interquartile range (IQR). Furthermore, whiskers characterize the natural bounds of the 
distributions whereas points denote outliers. 
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Figure 5. Tukey’s boxplots (for 2006 and 2010, respectively) comparing relative inefficiency scores 
below and above local median population (Source: own construction) 
 
As a result, one can discern that, on average, smaller municipalities are more efficient in 
creating the conditions to attract and/or to retain private firms than their larger 
counterparts. These findings thus corroborate those of Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2006), 
where the largest cities are absent from the top list. 
In DEA literature, financial dependence is usually negatively associated with municipal 
performance (see Table 1). We thereby divided the efficiency results below and above 
the median of a measure of fiscal autonomy in Figure 6. For this exercise we considered 
the percentage of own funds generated by the municipality in relation to its total 
revenues (which decreased from 48,65% in 2006 to 44,85% in 2010, on average). 
Figure 6. Tukey’s boxplots (for 2006 and 2010, respectively) comparing relative inefficiency scores 
below and above a measure of financial independence (Source: own construction) 
 
We found that more financially independent regions appear to display better 































6, which constitute evidence that smaller and less dependent municipalities are more 
resilient to crises, are in accordance with the efficiency-enhancing effect of voter 
involvement advocated by Geys et al. (2010). 
Nevertheless, these findings should be subject to a more refined scrutiny (namely, a 
second stage) as these raw analyses may hide important features. For example, more 
dependent municipalities are also those a priori poorer and, for this reason, they receive 
higher contributions from the national budget and more European cohesion funds.  
 
VII. Second Stage: Environmental Dataset and Theoretical Hypothesis 
The inefficiency found in the previous section may not be exclusively attributable to 
poor municipal management. As Afonso and Fernandes (2008, p. 1985) put it, “one has 
to assume that some municipalities are unable to achieve the “best-practice” due to a 
relative harsh environment”. The following non-discretionary factors – i.e., outside the 
mayor’s control, at least in the short-run – are thus taken into account to evaluate which 
of them drive the ability of local authorities to generate higher performance levels:
20
 
– Demography. Given that local governments are closer to citizens, decentralization 
presents several informational benefits for voter’s accountability. For instance, one 
could refer the Tieboutean hypothesis (1956) regarding the analogy between competing 
regional governments and private firms or Oates’ theory (1972) stating that better 
matching arises when local preferences are heterogeneous. Despite all these advantages, 
decentralization may also contribute to higher administrative costs and to negative 
externalities originated by a lack of coordination and risk sharing. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether high Population Density is detrimental (Geys, 2006) or helpful (Geys et 
al., 2010) to efficiency. Moreover, to account for the population age-structure, a high 
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 A detailed explanation of all environmental variables and data sources is offered in Table A.4. 
Correlation matrices are presented in Table A.5 (for 2006) and Table A.6 (for 2010). 
18 
 
Dependency ratio is expected to have a negative influence on the capacity to attract 
investment and hence on municipal competitiveness; 
– Political preferences. Firstly, to test Cox and McCubbin’s (1986) hypothesis that the 
central government may favor his supporters in the allocation of funds, we introduce a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when the prime-minister and the mayor 
belong to the same political party (SamePolParty) as suggested by Veiga (2011). 
Secondly, to control for the effects of distinct political ideologies and agendas, we use 
the fraction of Leftist Mandates in each jurisdiction. In this regard, since Reynolds et al. 
(1994) argued that right-wing conservatism tends to be related with a resilient 
entrepreneurial culture, a negative coefficient is expected. Thirdly, it is not clear 
whether the effects of strong majorities regarding efficiency are positive (Borge et al., 
2008) or negative (Kalb et al., 2012). Consequently, a Majority dummy is added. Lastly, 
as the electoral engagement fosters civic awareness (Geys et al., 2010), Abstention in 
local elections is also considered and a positive coefficient is anticipated;  
– Human Capital.  We include micro level data regarding the percentage of graduates 
in each municipality for two reasons. Hamilton (1983), on the one hand, defended that 
the ability to monitor local efficiency depends on the educational level of residents. On 
the other, Baptista and Mendonça (2010) found that regional access to knowledge and 
an educated workforce significantly influences firm location in specific sectors; 
– Wealth. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and later studies showed that wealthier people 
are more inclined to become entrepreneurs because liquidity constraints tend to exclude 
those with insufficient funds at their disposal. To properly control these effects, we 
proxy municipal wealth using the mean value of real estate;  
– Justice. In recent times, an important debate regarding the reforms in the judicial 
system arose in Portugal. To understand if the access to justice is relevant for business 
19 
 
creation and development, we add the Number of first instance courts and, if significant, 
a positive impact is expected;  
– Accessibility. We account for the possibility that new motorways increase the 
attractiveness of locations close to, at least, one of these infrastructures (Holl, 2004) 
using a Highway dummy; 
– Labor market. To take into consideration the effects of a depressed labor market 
environment, we enlarge our analysis with the unemployment rate. Fritsch and Falck 
(2007) put forward that a high level of short-term unemployment has a positive impact 
on the number of start-ups. The effects in the long-run, however, may be different 
depending on the displacement vis-à-vis the induced effects of entrepreneurship on 
regional employment (Mueller et al., 2008).  
To conclude, the summary statistics of all environmental factors, along with the 
theoretical hypothesis above defined, are shown in Table 3. 
 
VIII. Evaluating Efficiency Results and Policy Implications 
In this section we follow Cruz and Marques (2014), one of the first papers to apply 
Simar and Wilson’s double-bootstrap technique (2007) to test how exogenous variables 
affect the relative efficiency found in section VI. This procedure relies on a coherent 
data generating process to produce a pseudo-frontier which takes into account the 
sampling distribution of the bias term. In this study we compute “Algorithm #2” where 
100 replications were used to generate bias-corrected estimates of a previous truncated 
(rather than censored) regression. Afterwards, 2000 replications were employed to 
calculate confidence intervals at 95%. At this phase, one should bear in mind that since 
the dependent variable in the previous method is an inefficiency estimate, a positive 
(negative) value for a given coefficient corresponds to a negative (positive) relationship 
between the respective environmental variable and municipal performance.  At the 0,05 
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Table 3. Summary statistics and theoretical hypothesis for 2006 and 2010 (Source: own construction) 
Variables  Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Hypothesis 
Population Density  
          2006 
          2010 
Age Dependency ratio 
          2006 
          2010 
Same Political Party dummy 
          2006 
          2010 
Leftist Mandates (%) 
          2006 
          2010 
Majority dummy 
          2006 
          2010 
Abstention in local election years 
          2006 
          2010 
Graduates (%) 
          2006 
          2010 
Mean value of real estate  
          2006 
          2010 
Number of first instance courts 
          2006 
          2010 
Highway dummy 
          2006 
          2010 
Unemployment rate (%) 
          2006 








































































































































































































level, β is only statistically significantly different from zero when both the lower and the 
upper bounds of the confidence interval have the same signal.
21
  
A preliminary calculation is run using all aforementioned variables.
22
 Then, we decided 
to remove, for each specification, variables that displayed broadly symmetric bounds. 
Several robustness checks were performed to assess the trustworthiness of our options.
23
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results for 2006 and 2010, respectively. 
                                                          
21
 For more details on Simar and Wilson’s double-bootstrap (2007) see the Technical Appendix. 
22
 Results are offered in Table A.7 and Table A.8. In 2006, the Age dependency ratio and Leftist mandates 
are found to be negatively associated with performance. For 2010, however, we are not able to find any 
statistically significant result, a clear sign of the magnitude of the financial crisis on efficiency. 
23
 In this exercise, we used two other variables computed with micro data from Quadros de Pessoal. In 
the wealth component, we substituted the Mean value of real estate for the average total wage per capita 
in the municipality. We did not include both due to collinearity reasons. The same aspect can be referred 
for the next two variables. In the part related to human capital, Graduates (%) was also replaced for the 
percentage of workers with knowledge intensive occupations (i.e., engineers, natural or social scientists, 
business or legal professionals and technicians operating in the fields of mathematics and health). Both 
cases yielded broadly similar results to those presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
21 
 
Table 4. Simar and Wilson (2007) double-bootstrap results in the baseline specification for 2006 
(Source: own construction) 
  
          β 
Confidence Interval (95%) 




     Age Dependency ratio 
Political Preferences 
     Same Political Party dummy 
     Leftist Mandates (%) 
     Majority dummy 
Human Capital 
     Graduates (%) 
Justice 
     Number of first instance courts 
Labor Market 
     Unemployment rate (%) 
Econometric Control 

























































Table 5. Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap results in the baseline specification for 2010 
(Source: own construction) 
  
          β 
Confidence Interval (95%) 




     Population Density 
     Age Dependency ratio 
Political Preferences 
     Same Political Party dummy 
     Majority dummy 
     Abstention rate (%) 
Human Capital 
     Graduates (%) 
Justice 
     Number of first instance courts 
Accessibility 
     Highway dummy 
Econometric Control 






















































In 2006, three items were found statistically significant in our analysis.
24
 First, the age 
dependency ratio seems to be the main driver of inefficiency in the period, which may 
be explained by the ageing problem. Concerning the political determinants, right-wing 
local governments appear to outperform leftist ones. One should, however, take 
cautiously into account what is being evaluated. It could perfectly be the case that if 
some other “social” or “environmental” outputs were included, these results would be 
somehow different. More importantly, citizens who vote for left-wing parties may 
prefer to have more public goods provided by public firms or a less unequal 
environment. Conversely, the dummy that reflects the fact that the prime minister and 
                                                          
24
 In general, statistically significant empirical findings side with those of Cruz and Marques (2014). 
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mayor belong to the same political party seems to exert a positive effect over efficiency. 
This result is nonetheless richer if one takes into account the conclusions put forward by 
Veiga (2011, p. 232): “…the distribution of grant funding is skewed towards 
municipalities with more competitive races and where parties in central government 
have stronger political support.”  Therefore, aligned local authorities may easily find 
other financial sources vis-à-vis mayors with weaker political ties with the central 
authorities. In this regard, one should not be confused with the interpretations that 
followed Figure 6. If we pointed out that more financially dependent municipalities are, 
on average, less efficient, we are now going one step further by saying that, controlling 
for comparable municipalities, some may be able to achieve higher performance levels 
due to positive externalities emanating from a closer relationship with the government. 
In contrast, we were only able to identify one driver of local performance for 2010. This 
outcome gives per se a clear idea of the strong impact of the Global Financial crisis on 
Portuguese municipalities. A high age dependency ratio seems to be accountable, once 
again, for decreasing regional efficiency in fostering the conditions for firm location and 
growth. This structural issue, thus, must be met with properly designed policy 
recommendations. For example, specific policies aimed at attracting young 
entrepreneurs to inland regions, by facilitating their access to finance, may constitute a 
step in the right direction. In addition, the importance of technological upgrade 
programs to promote incumbents exporting capacities should also be underlined.  
 
IX. Final Remarks 
The current thesis aims to examine the institutional role of municipalities in creating the 
conditions to encourage private initiative, opportunity recognition and willingness to 
take risks. We contribute to the literature in three major issues. To begin with, we study, 
for the first time, the previous research question using Data Envelopment Analysis 
23 
 
(DEA) to assess efficiency and a demanding double-bootstrap to evaluate its 
determinants. Second, we compare the effects after and during the Global Financial 
Crisis by selecting two post local (and national) election years (2006 and 2010).  
Moreover, we depart from the related literature where the most widely used input 
variables are measures of spending size rather than fiscal responsibility. Last but not 
least, we use both desirable and undesirable outputs in the first and an extensive range 
of environmental traits in the second stage. 
This study has also its limitations. Besides the classical problem of choosing all the 
relevant variables to assess efficiency, exacerbated by a strong opposition against 
implementing performance evaluation models in Portuguese municipalities, one should 
bear in mind that some of them may be strongly constrained in their movements 
towards the production function. These usual claims are hereby dealt, to the extent that 
is possible, by performing several (preliminary) regression-based robustness checks. 
Our study presents additional evidence that the effects of an ageing population are 
particularly important for regional development. We find that during both normal times 
and in times of crisis, more dependent municipalities (not only in demographic terms 
but also in financial resources) are, on average, less efficient. 
In the future, with increasingly detailed available data, it may be possible to extend our 
investigation with new institutional variables (e.g., average days until payment, 
transparency and fiscal stability indices) or across economic sectors. For instance, the 
differences between the consequences of entrepreneurship due to pecuniary or 
knowledge externalities should be explored.
25
 To conclude, new avenues of research 
may unlock efficiency as well as effectiveness from the point of view of three distinct 
concerns: sustainability, accountability and quality of life.  
                                                          
25
 Whereas resource endowments and low labor costs may be relatively more important to common firms 
and respective suppliers, the capacity of attracting innovative people is a key input to technological 
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Table A.1 International comparisons on local governments (Source: own construction with data from 
EU Subnational Governments: 2010 Key Figures. 2011/2012 Edition) 













































































Table A.2. Definition of Inputs (I) and Outputs (O) in the baseline specification for 2006 and 2010 
(Source: own construction, adapted from Arouca, 2013)  
Variable Operational Description Data source 
(I) Industrial area  
 
(I) Tourism area  
 
(I) Primary expenditures/ 
Total Expenditures 






Percentage of municipal area allocated for industrial usage according to 
the official PMOT: Municipal Spatial and Land use Plan  
Percentage of municipal area allocated for industrial usage according to 
the official PMOT: Municipal Spatial and Land use Plan 
Total annual expenditure of municipalities minus annual interest 
payments divided by total annual expenditures  
Ratio between predicted duration of construction works and effective 
duration of construction works (in months) 
Number of firms attracted to each municipality divided by the number 
of firms functioning in the same area  
Inverse of the number of firms leaving the municipality divided by the 














Acronyms for sources of annual raw data correspondence: DGOTDU (Office for Spatial Planning and Urbanism), INE a) (Statistics 
Portugal- Regional Statistical Yearbooks), INE b) (Statistics Portugal- Inquérito aos Projectos de Obras de Edificação e de 
Demolição de Edifícios and Estatísticas das Obras concluídas). 
Remaining doubts are answered by the author upon request. 
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Table A.3. Previous robustness checks (Source: own construction)  
 I 
Entry_inc 
          II 
NetEntry_inc 
Infrastructural Geographic Area 
     Industrial Area 
     Tourism Area 
Governance Responsibility 
     Primary Exp/ Total Expenditures 
Licensing outline 
     Construction Ratio 
Political Preferences 
     Same Political Party dummy 
     Leftist Mandates 
     Majority Dummy 
NUTS 2 Dummies 
Year Dummies 
Econometric Control 
     Constant 
Summary Statistics 
     Number of observations 






































    0,1009*    (0,0539) 
    0,0222*    (0,0112) 
 
0,5809***    (0,0801) 
 
    0,0203*    (0,0114) 
 
    0,0026*    (0,0026) 
     -0,0055    (0,0063) 
     -0,0016    (0,0044) 
            Yes 
            Yes 
 
-0,6263***    (0,0789) 
 
           1946 
        0,2748 
Notes:  
All explanatory variables were lagged one period to account for potential endogeneity. 
A broader sample from 2003 to 2010 is studied to assure results are stable in the long-run.  
Roughly similar results were found for the 2006 and 2010 period. Three controls are added to examine Political Preferences. 
Significance at 10% denoted by *; 5% by **; 1% by ***. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
 
Figure A.1. Average efficiency scores in the baseline specification per year using a quadratic fitting 
(Source: own construction) 
Total Expenditure                                         Total Expenditure PC 
 
Primary Expenditure PC                                 Inverse of Interest Expenditures 
 













































































































Table A.4. Definition of environmental variables in the baseline specification for 2006 and 2010 
(Source: own construction, adapted from Arouca, 2013)  
Variable Operational Description Data source 
Population Density 
 
Age Dependency ratio 
 
Same Political Party 
dummy 








Mean value of real estate  
 




Unemployment rate (%) 
 
Ratio of resident population per squared kilometre of municipal 
territory (k inhabitants per km2) 
Ratio of individuals typically not in the labor force (aged 0-14 and 
65+) and active population (aged 15-64) 
Coincidence between the prime minister and mayor’s political party (in 
those cases, the dummy variable is equal to one)  
Percentage of mandates in the municipal local authority assigned to 
parties or coalitions ideologically leftist (PS, CDU and BE) 
Existence of a majority governing the Municipal Assembly (in those 
cases, the dummy variable is equal to one)  
Percentage of voters in the municipality who refrained or abstained  
from voting in local elections years (2005 and 2009) 
Percentage of employees working in the municipality who hold a 
university degree (tertiary level of education)  
Average value of real estates traded throughout the year in the 
municipality (k € per estate) 
Number of General and Specialized  and Specific jurisdiction courts of 
first instance in the municipality  
Existence of at least one highway passing through the municipality (in 
those cases, the dummy variable is equal to one)  

























Acronyms for sources of annual raw data correspondence: DGAI (Office for Internal Affairs), INE a) (Statistics Portugal- Regional 
Statistical Yearbooks), IEFP (Institute for Employment and Vocational Training) 
Remaining doubts are answered by the author upon request. 
 
Table A.5. Correlation Table for the 2006 specification (Source: own construction) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1           
2 -0.3190 1          
3 -0.0121 0.0439 1         
4 0.0047 -0.0001 0.4843 1        
5 -0.1979 0.1062 0.0457 -0.0894 1       
6 0.3657 -0.4158 -0.0428 0.1393 -0.1742 1      
7 0.5741 -0.3146 -0.0926 0.0018 -0.1813 0.4514 1     
8 0.3467 -0.4160 -0.0441 0.1622 -0.1094 0.4681 0.4328 1    
9 0.5205 -0.2676 -0.0349 -0.0686 -0.1865 0.3261 0.4949 0.3211 1   
10 0.1833 -0.4421 -0.0074 -0.0453 -0.0836 0.3183 0.2765 0.3014 0.2944 1  
11 0.0918 -0.2246 0.0950 0.1289 0.0470 -0.1502 -0.0175 0.0535 0.0795 0.0048 1 
Notes: 1. Population Density; 2. Age Dependency ratio; 3. Same Political Party dummy; 4. Leftist Mandates (%);5. Majority 
dummy; 6. Abstention in local election years; 7. Graduates (%);8. Mean value of real estate; 9. Number of first instance courts; 10. 
Highway dummy; 11. Unemployment rate (%) 
 
Table A.6. Correlation Table for the 2010 specification (Source: own construction) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1           
2 -0.2826 1          
3 -0.0070 0.0063 1         
4 -0.0056 0.0452 0.5046 1        
5 -0.1669 0.0379 -0.0194 -0.0740 1       
6 0.3193 -0.3175 -0.0928 0.0039 -0.0924 1      
7 0.5234 -0.2656 -0.0460 -0.0151 -0.1451 0.4208 1     
8 0.3793 -0.3774 -0.0032 0.1632 -0.1223 0.3417 0.4260 1    
9 0.4846 -0.2007 0.0209 -0.0417 -0.0738 0.2345 0.4525 0.2964 1   
10 0.1896 -0.4020 -0.0362 -0.1069 -0.0645 0.3144 0.3167 0.3295 0.2600 1  
11 0.0673 -0.2510 0.1213 0.0227 0.0101 -0.0823 -0.1000 0.0007 0.1156 0.0278 1 
Notes: 1. Population Density; 2. Age Dependency ratio; 3. Same Political Party dummy; 4. Leftist Mandates (%);5. Majority 
dummy; 6. Abstention in local election years; 7. Graduates (%);8. Mean value of real estate; 9. Number of first instance courts; 10. 




Table A.7. Preliminary Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap results in the baseline 
specification for 2006 (Source: own construction) 
  
          β 
Confidence Interval (95%) 




      Population Density  
     Age Dependency ratio 
Political Preferences 
     Same Political Party dummy 
     Leftist Mandates (%) 
     Majority dummy 
     Abstention in local election years 
Human Capital 
     Graduates (%) 
Wealth 
     Mean value of real estate  
Justice 
     Number of first instance courts 
Accessibility 
     Highway dummy 
Labor Market 
     Unemployment rate (%) 
Econometric Control 


















































































Table A.8. Preliminary Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap results in the baseline 
specification for 2010 (Source: own construction) 
  
         β 
Confidence Interval (95%) 




      Population Density  
     Age Dependency ratio 
Political Preferences 
     Same Political Party dummy 
     Leftist Mandates (%) 
     Majority dummy 
     Abstention in local election years 
Human Capital 
     Graduates (%) 
Wealth 
     Mean value of real estate  
Justice 
     Number of first instance courts 
Accessibility 
     Highway dummy 
Labor Market 
     Unemployment rate (%) 
Econometric Control 


























































































Let θ0A denote VRS estimates of an output oriented DEA computation of relative 
performance scores (as we did in section VI). As previously explained, a second stage is 
then performed in order to assess how environmental factors Zi (described in section 
VII) impacted on θ0. However, problems arise from the fact that: 
a) θ0A is a biased estimator of θ0; 
b) θ0 is serially correlated Zi ; 
c) the error term εi is correlated with Zi given that xi and yi are both correlated with 
Zi. 
 
To solve the abovementioned issues, Simar and Wilson (2007) developed methodology 
using a double-bootstrap procedure. The overall idea is to obtain bias corrected 
estimates of θ0: 
θ0B = θ0A – bîas (θ0A) 
and use them to compute  
θ0B = f (Zi ; εi) 
where B denotes bias corrected estimates of a previous approximation A. 
  
The procedure consists of the following steps: 
1) Considering the original data, construct estimates of θ0 (xi,yi) for all DMUs by 
DEA; 
2) By maximum likelihood (ML), calculate θ0 and δε from the normal truncated 
regression θ0A  ≈  Zi β + εij (only estimates of θ0 > 1 will be used in this step); 
3) Loop over the next three steps for L bootstraps estimates (in our case, 100 and 
2000, respectively) for βA and δA:  
     For each j = 1, …, 278 draw εij from N [0, δε
2
 ] distributed with left truncation 
at (1 − Zi βA);  
     Compute θ0  = Zi βA + εi;  
     Coming back to the ML truncated regression to estimate φ* = Zi β + εij. 
4) Use the bootstrap values estimated in 3) and the original βA and δεA to create 
confidence intervals (in our case, at 95% level) for β and δ. 
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Table 1. Variables and Findings of the related literature (Source: own construction, adapted from Cruz and Marques (2014)) 
First Stage Inputs (I) and Outputs (O) Second Stage Non-discretionary Factors Innovations and Results 
1) De Borger et al. (1994) using 589 Belgian municipalities 
(I) No. of white collar workers; No. of blue collar workers; surface of 
buildings owned by the municipalities. (O) Surface of municipal roads; 
No. minimal subsistence grants; No. of students in local primary 
schools; Surface of public recreational facilities; Ratio of nonresidents 
to residents. 
2) De Borger and Kerstens (1996) using 589 Belgian municipalities 
(I) Municipal expenditures. (O) No. of beneficiaries of minimal 
subsistence grants; No. of students enrolled in local primary schools; 
Surface of public recreational facilities; Population; Fraction of the 
population older than 65. 
3) Prieto and Zofio (2001) using 209 Spanish municipalities  
(I) Personnel expenditure; Other operational expenditure; Current 
transfers; Capital transfers; Capital expenditure. (O) Population; 
Number of lighting points; Urban waste collected; Street infrastructure 
area; Area of public parks; Quality. 
4) Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) using 414 Spanish municipalities 
(I) Expenditures on goods and services; Current transfers; Capital 
expenditure; wages and salaries. (O) Population; Tons of waste; Street 
infrastructure; Public parks; Quality 
5) Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) using 353 Finish municipalities 
(I) Total expenditures. (O) No. of children daycare centres; No. of visits 
to basic health and dental care; Institutional care of the elderly and 
handicapped; Hours of teaching; Total loans in municipal libraries 
6) Sousa and Stósic (2005) using 4796 Brazilian municipalities 
(I) Total current expenditures; No. of teachers; No. of hospital and 
health centers; Rate of infant mortality. (O) Population; Literate 
population; School enrollment; School attendance; Promotions to the 
next grade; Students in the proper grade; Water coverage; Wastewater 
coverage; Waste coverage 
7) Bönisch et al., (2011) using 203 German municipalities 
(I) Labor; Capital; Resources and intermediate inputs. (O) Population; 
child care places; children in elementary school; traffic and recreational 
area; employees 
8) Afonso and Fernandes (2008) using 278 mainland municipalities 
(I) Total expenditures 
(O) Local Government Output Indicator 
 
Population; No. of coalition parties; Dummies for the liberal and 
socialist parties; Per capita Income; Size of the block grants; Share of 




No. of coalition parties; Dummies for the liberal and socialist parties; 
Income per capita; Property tax rate; Size of the per capita block grants; 
Share of the adult population with just a primary education degree; 
Population density. 
 
Tax revenue; Size of block grants; Self-generated revenue; Financial 




Taxes; Grants; Self-generated revenues; Financial liabilities; Deficit; 
Votes received by ruling party candidates 
 
Population; Earned income; Education level; Location and physical 
structure distance; Age of employees; Producer of services (% of all 









Population density; Share of senior citizens; Relative population change; 
Type of municipality; Debt per capita; Relative equalization 
Transfers; Unemployment rate 
 
Distance to the district capital; Population with secondary education; 
Population with tertiary education; Per capita purchasing power; 
Population density; Annual population growth. 
 
Population and higher education rates have a positive efficiency effect.  
Block grants yield a negative influence; the presence of liberals and the 




Property rate tax and population density seem to exhort a positive    
influence. Personal income, the size of the per capita block grants and the 
percentage of population with only primary education have a negative 
influence on efficiency. 
 
Block grants and high percentage of votes for the governing party have a 




Empirical evidence towards the idea that resources may be better 
allocated by large municipalities. 
 
The most efficient municipalities were rather small. 
Political variables and turnover in local elections did not explain 
efficiency while Peripheral location, high income, and high 
unemployment tend to reduce it. 
 
 









Purchasing power and education have a positive influence. 
Distance to the capital of district may have a negative influence. 
9) Cruz and Marques (2014) using 308 Portuguese municipalities 
(I) No. Of staff; Capital expenditures; Other operational expenditures. 
(O) Population, Extension of municipal roads, urban waste collected; 
driking water supplied; wastewater treated; No. of infrastructures 
 
Tourism, Island, Topography, Illeteracy, Concentration, Purchasing 
power, Financial independence, Area, No. of parishes, Public housing, 
Net debt 
 
One of the first papers to apply Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure. 
Empirical evidence suggesting a clear difference between mainland and 
overseas municipalities. 
Notes: Free Disposable Hull (FDH) technique, another non-parametric method which relaxes the convexity assumption required on DEA, is also used by papers 1), 2) and 4). 
           Some Portuguese variables were not used in this paper due to consistency reasons or lack of data availability (for example, the number of infrastructures or the purchasing power for 2006 and 2010). 
